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Breakfast with Rogozin 06MOSCOW10227
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 010227 SIPDIS
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016 TAGS: PGOV, PINR, RS
SUBJECT: BREAKFAST WITH ROGOZIN: TALES OF A KREMLIN PROJECT
Classified By: PolMinCouns Alice G. Wells: 1.5 (b) and (d) 1.
(SBU) Summary: As the political season commences, the rise and
fall of former Rodina Party Chairman Dmitry Rogozin is a
cautionary tale for other politicians seeking poster-boy status
in Kremlin electoral projects and a timely reminder of the
ability of the Presidential Administration to intervene in the
political process. One of Russia's most charismatic, clever, and
potentially dangerous politicians, Rogozin is frustrated by his
sojourn in the political wilderness -- which he attributed to
his unsettling success in attracting voters, Orange
revolution-era praise of Ukrainian President Yushchenko, and
gullibility in taking on Moscow Mayor Luzhkov -- and is looking
for a way back, through the nationalist trump card of Ukraine,
Belarus, the Baltics, and frozen conflicts. End Summary
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Putin's Pet -----------
2. (C) In conjunction with the September 8
release of his book, "Enemy of the Nation," former Rodina party
chairman Dmitry Rogozin hit the publicity circuit, deigning to
breakfast with us as one stop on his presumed path to political
redemption. Six months following his forced removal from the
party's leadership after a racist television advertisement
culminated in Rodina's exclusion from seven out of eight
regional ballots, Rogozin was hardly contrite as he fed us his
version of his Kremlin-propelled career arc: -- a self-declared
"Putin project," Rogozin came to the President's attention in
2002 while working on the transit rights of Russian citizens in
Kaliningrad, in his capacity as Chairman of the Duma's
International Relations Committee. Putin, who liked Rogozin's
rhetorical punch and political effectiveness, offered him
leadership of United Russia, but settled on Rogozin's
spearheading of Rodina in 2003, as a leftist political
combination that would bleed support from the Communists and
Zhirinovsky. -- to the alarm of the Kremlin, Rogozin's blend of
Russian chauvinism and great power nationalism proved
"shockingly" effective and Rodina had the misfortune of
garnering "too many votes," attracting 150,000 members in six
months (sic), and shooting up to second place in the opinion
polls and party fundraising -- second only to Putin and United
Russia, despite a lack of access to administrative resources.
Wistfully recalling his popularity, Rogozin savored one
particular live television debate conducted in prime-time ("they
learned; they don't do that anymore"), in which he purportedly
cleaned the clocks of his United Russia counterpart. --
misreading the political tea leaves and disturbed by his visit
to Beslan in the aftermath of the terrorist 2004 takeover of the
school, Rogozin called then-Ukrainian presidential candidate
Yushchenko and praised "on human terms" his public condolence
over the loss of life. This, followed by his November 2004 visit
to Kiev, donning of an orange scarf, public embrace with
Yushchenko, and increasingly strident criticism of Putin's
failed policy toward the orange revolution, Rogozin claims, was
the last nail in his political coffin. -- forgetting that he was
on a leash, Rogozin began to stray too far and ultimately
crossed Kremlin redlines, to the anger of Putin. Believing that
he was an opposition politician, he began to take, and even
savor, opportunistic pot-shots at the President and to adopt
crowd-pleasing tactics such as his February 2005 ten-day hunger
strike to protest the cutting of social subsidies. This,
Carnegie analyst Dmitry Trenin told us, was Rogozin's real sin:
he stopped playing at being an opposition politician and started
acting like one.
Fall from Grace ---------------
3. (C) Rogozin's account of his fall from
political grace, as self-serving, was by his account equally
Kremlin-driven: -- Kremlin anger over Rogozin's agenda and
tactics translated into orders to intimidate and injure Rodina's
supporters. Swearing that one misanthrope was released from jail
for 24-hours solely for the purpose of attacking the party's
Volgograd leader with an axe, in exchange for a reduced
sentence, Rogozin said the authorities' message was unambiguous,
particularly when followed by other assaults on family members
of the party leadership and threats to Rogozin's wife and son.
-- Governors and other regional powerbrokers had "friendly"
conversations with Rodina politicians, spelling out the
consequences of Rogozin's continued chairmanship of the party.
The specter of other strong-arm tactics -- including stripping
Rodina of its name and disqualifying its registration -- were
raised. -- Defacto barred from television, Rogozin maintained
that it was the government-influenced mass media that worked
overtime to create the image of Rogozin as a pro-Hitler,
anti-US, "monster" inciting skinhead attacks. The infamous
advertisement run during the Moscow city elections implicitly
disparaging people "of Caucasian nationality" and promoting
"Russia for Russians" was, he first insisted, really about
sanitary conditions in the capital. When criticized by us for
inciting ethnic tensions, Rogozin took a different tack and said
he had been encouraged by the Kremlin to take on Moscow Mayor
Luzhkov where he was vulnerable -- illegal immigration. Luzhkov
won. While Rogozin railed against the Mayor's corrupt practices,
he grudgingly admired his chutzpah in having Liberal Democratic
Party leader (and outspoken xenophobe) Zhirinovsky lead the
charge against Rodina in the courts that ultimately led to the
party's disqualification in seven of eight regional elections. –
Courting Public Opinion -----------------------
4. (SBU) Rogozin told us of his continued desire
to be a player, but, he insisted, not in a toothless
parliamentary body. The answer, he maintained, was to kick-start
a social movement based on Great Slav unity, which in separate
press interviews he articulated as promoting the union of Russia
and Belarus, the right of dual citizenship in Ukraine, the
protection of ethnic Russian minorities in the Baltics, and the
cause of the frozen conflicts. Mikhail Demurin, head of Rodina's
International Department, elaborated to us the party's
dissatisfaction over the "corporate" foreign policy espoused by
the Kremlin. Rather than split the wealth among insiders, he
said, Rodina believed that Russia should be prepared to pay a
price -- in subsidized oil and gas, and other preferential trade
and security regimes -- to maintain influence over former
republics. While Rogozin sits outside the party structure for
"tactical considerations," he affirmed to us that the would
continue to throw his weight behind Rodina and its nationalist
agenda.
5. (C) More neutral observers testify to
Rodina's -- and specifically Rogozin's -- electoral drawing
power. Golos Director Lilia Shebanova told us that despite
Rogozin's sidelining, the party has by Russian standards a deep
bench of energetic regional representatives. Rogozin's blend of
nationalism and chauvinism, while alienating a strata of the
elite, generated a stable bedrock of support. Shebanova and
political representatives across the spectrum predicted Rodina's
reelection to the Duma, with or without a merger. Demurin noted
that Rodina's 11 percent placement in the one republic that it
was permitted to contest elections was achieved despite ethnic
Russians constituting less than half the population. Carnegie's
Trenin predicted that Rogozin's social movement would not amount
to much, but did leave the deposed party leader well-positioned
to leave political limbo when the next opportunity presented
itself. -------
Comment -------
6. (C) Rogozin is clinical when discussing
tactics for resurrecting his public profile and political
standing, and lacks any of the fervor typically associated with
the nationalist wing in Russia. He shrugged off our concern over
his track record and agenda: this was politics, not personal.
His ability to find a local publisher, albeit one that
specializes in xenophobic and anti-Semitic literature (a
sampling: "Masons in Power in Russia," "For Motherland! For
Stalin!", "Judaic Yoke") indicates that he is not beyond the
Kremlin's political pale. By rededicating himself to "patriotic"
causes, Rogozin clearly hopes to become a player in the
2007-2008 election campaigns and (as his purported effort to
curry favor with the Kremlin by challenging Luzhkov
demonstrates) is not picky about which camp he occupies, as long
as it provides a visible political berth. BURNS
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