Military
Resistance
and
Arab
and
Muslim
Liberation
By
Caise
D.
Hassan
Some
sympathizers
of
Arab
and
Muslim
liberation
movements
have criticized
their
use
of
violence:
They
state
that
the
gun
is
not
the
proper or
most
effective
way
to
free
a
people.
Violence,
they
argue,
cannot
defeat the
might
of
states
like
Israel
and
the
United
States.
Practicing
such violence
incurs
the
wrath
of
the
occupier;
it
also
contradicts
the
victims¹
claims
that
their
struggle
is
for
political
and
human
rights,
alienating potential
Western
or
Israeli
sympathizers.
The
conclusion
of
this
argument is
that
the
achievement
of
independence
comes
through
negotiation
and non-violence,
not
military
action.
However,
the
distinction
of
successful
recent
Arab
and
Muslim liberation
movements
is
that
their
violence
was
a
major
factor
in
the Invaders’
decisions
to
leave.
Here,
I
will
identify
several
of
these successes
and
explain
why
military
action
worked.
Before
doing
so,
I
will address
the
thoughtful
objection
to
violence
mentioned
above:
Guerrilla warfare
brings
the
wrath
of
the
powerful
upon
innocent
Arabs
and
Muslims.
Certainly,
a
revolutionary
movement
should
not
invite
casualties
upon its
people.
Israel,
for
example,
willfully
can
bomb
Arab
neighborhoods
in
a manner
that
is
far
bloodier
than
a
Palestinian
attack
on
Israelis.
But
we
can
recognize
that
occupier
violence
is
independent
of
the
level of
violence
committed
by
the
colonized.
It
is
the
fact
that
the
colonized are
revolting
through
any
means--violent
or
non-violent--that
convinces
the occupier
to
“punish”
the
collective.
As
Arabs
and
Muslims
demand
the
end
of foreign
rule,
the
powerful
will
fight
back
to
inflict
humiliation
and
grief upon
those
who
revolt
and,
ultimately,
to
gain
the
subjects’
submission.
These
attacks
happen
both
before
and
after
violent
resistance
from
a
people;
they
are
not
necessarily
a
calculated
response
to
guerrilla
violence.
The
Palestinian
situation
in
the
late
1980s
and
1990s
and
the
Bosnian genocide
illustrate
that
Arabs
and
Muslims
may
experience
mass
murder
and expulsion
even
though
they
pursue
only
political
action
to
achieve
their independence.
From
the
start
of
the
first
Intifada,
Israeli
Defense
Minister Yitzhak
Rabin
asserted
that
Israeli
troops
will
“break
the
bones”
of
the children
demonstrating.
The
world¹s
fourth
largest
army
killed
over
400 Palestinians
and
wounded
20,000
the
first
year
of
the
Intifada.
Palestinian military
action
was
comparatively
minor.
During
the
entire
Intifada,
Palestinians
killed
100
Israelis,
mainly
soldiers
in
Gaza,
trespasses
that do
not
justify
Rabin¹s
measures.
Israeli
violence
continued
into
the
Oslo period,
even
though
the
P.L.O.
ended
its
armed
resistance.
The
Israeli
air force
kept
bombing
civilian
areas,
most
notable,
the
Q¹ana
refugee
camp
in Lebanon.
The
Bosnian
attempt
at
peaceful
succession
from
Yugoslavia
brought
even more
dire
consequences.
Serbian
leaders
threatened
the
Bosnian
Muslims
when they
affirmed
their
sovereignty.
Serb
Democratic
Party
head
Radovan
Karadzic told
the
Muslim
leaders
that,
by
declaring
independence,
they
are
leading The
“Muslim
nation”
into
oblivion
because
“they
have
no
means
of
defending themselves”
in
a
war.
Karadzic
and
the
other
Serbian
nationalists
delivered their
promise
when,
led
by
President
Slobodan
Milosevic,
they
“cleansed”
and expelled
tens
of
thousands
of
Muslims
from
Yugoslavia.
The
expulsions
abated when
the
Bosnians
began
to
defend
themselves
and
after
belated
Western military
intervention.
The
possible
casualties
Arabs
and
Muslims
will
incur due
to
their
military
action
is
hence
not
a
valid
reason
for
abstaining
from military
revolt;
occupiers
are
as
likely
to
kill
the
non-violent
as
they
are the
armed.
Occupation
ends
when
the
invaders
can
no
longer
bear
the
death
of soldiers
who
police
the
occupation.
The
resistance
to
Israel
and
the
United States
in
the
Arab
world
supports
this
thesis,
whether
that
of
Egypt
in 1973,
or
of
popular
insurgencies
in
Palestine,
Lebanon,
and
Iraq.
Mindful that
there
are
multiple
motivations
for
withdrawal,
I
will
discuss
how military
resistance
was
a
crucial
factor
in
the
occupiers’
decisions
to
pull their
armies.
After
President
Abdul-Nasser’s
death,
the
Egyptian
government
tried
to negotiate
a
return
of
the
Sinai,
occupied
since
the
1967
war,
from
Israel.
Anwar
Sadat
in
1971
offered
the
Israelis
full
recognition
and
peace
in exchange
for
their
withdrawal
to
the
1967
borders.
The
Israeli
press reported
that
this
offer,
which
included
conditions
Israel
had
accused
the Arabs
of
“rejecting”
since
1948.
Israel
ignored
Sadat¹s
offer;
its
generals felt
confident
that,
after
such
a
swift
Israeli
defeat
of
the
Egyptian forces
in
1967,
the
Sinai
would
remain
securely
in
their
hands.
The Israelis
felt
no
need
to
negotiate
with
a
weaker
power.
Egypt
resorted
to
war.
The
Egyptian
army
trapped
several
Israeli
units in
the
Sinai
during
the
course
of
the
October
surprise
attack.
Had
it
not been
for
the
U.S.
airlift
of
supplies
to
the
Israelis,
the
Israeli
troops
“would¹ve
been
buried
in
the
desert,”
as
an
Israeli
journalist
who
was
one of
the
trapped
soldiers
told
me.
The
war
made
the
Israelis
realize
the
difficulty
of
controlling
the territory
of
an
adversary
that
fights
back.
Rather
than
endanger
their soldiers
in
the
Sinai’s
defense,
Israel
signed
a
peace
agreement
with
Egypt.
This
peace,
of
course,
benefited
Israel
tremendously
because
it
neutralized its
largest
enemy.
But,
we
should
not
miss
the
lesson
of
the
war.
Israel would
still
be
in
eastern
Egypt,
with
airbases
in
range
of
Cairo,
were
it not
for
1973.
Likewise,
there
were
few
U.S.
public
or
official
objections
to
the
Iraq invasion
and
occupation
until
the
mujahideen
in
Fallujah
inflicted
the
first serious
defeat
on
the
U.S.
Marines
in
April
2004.
About
70%
of
Americans supported
the
war
when
G.I.
George
W.
landed
on
an
aircraft
carrier
and declared
victory
in
May
2003.
Once
the
Marines’
siege
of
Fallujah
failed,
the
resistance
grew
and
inflicted
casualties
on
U.S.
troops
that
were reported
daily.
Now,
even
congressional
hawk
John
Murtha
has
sponsored withdrawal
resolutions.
It
cannot
be
overstated
that
neither
a
thirst
for
justice,
nor
moral
clairvoyance,
nor
any
sympathy
for
Arabs
convinced
the
U.S
public
to
oppose
the
war.
When
Marines
fired
on
the
people
of
Fallujah
as
they
held
a
peaceful
protest
against
the
presence
of
soldiers
in
their
school
after
the
invasion,
few
in
the
U.S.
noticed
or
cared.
The
opposition
to
the
war
grew
from
military
families
who
were
anguished
from
losing
their
children
to
the
Iraqi
resistance’s
fire.
Cindy
Sheehan’s
protests
are
the
most
vocal
example.
Sadly,
G.I.
Joe
had
to
suffer
many
amputations
and
funerals
for
the
tide
to
turn.
The
Lebanese
and
Palestinian
situations
offer
similar
lessons.
To invert
what
Zionist
pundits
are
fond
of
saying
about
Arabs,
Israelis,
apparently,
understand
only
the
language
of
force.
Hezbollah
drove
the
Israeli
army
out
of
Southern
Lebanon
through precise
attacks
on
the
soldiers
there,
but
with
a
skillful,
high-tech
twist.
The
guerrilla
group
often
filmed
the
operations
and
broadcast
them
on Hezbollah
T.V.,
which
was
received
in
Northern
Israel.
Israelis
could
see for
themselves
how
their
friends
and
relatives
in
the
army
were
dying
for the
occupation.
This
combination
of
military
resistance
and
political
savvy convinced
the
Israeli
public
and
some
of
its
Labor
party
that
the
occupation of
Lebanon
was
a
waste
of
blood.
Israel
left
South
Lebanon
without conditions.
Palestine
shows
little
hope
of
a
political
solution;
in
fact,
the scant
Palestinian
territorial
liberation
has
come
through
violence.
Israel
took
advantage
of
the
Oslo
truce
to
integrate
Palestinian
land,
economy,
and
resources
tighter
under
its
control.
As
the
P.L.O.
laid
down its
arms,
Israel
established
a
network
of
settlements
and
bypass
roads
that have
strangled
the
West
Bank
Arab
towns
and
erected
razor
wire
fences
that have
imprisoned
the
Gazans.
The
Palestinian
Authority’s
negotiations
with Israel
went
nowhere;
despite
Arafat’s
concessions
of
Palestinian sovereignty,
the
Israelis
felt
no
urgency
to
remove
settlements.
The
armed
groups
of
the
second
Intifada
forced
Israel
to
change
its strategy,
particularly
in
Gaza.
Palestinian
attacks
on
Jewish
settlements discouraged
new
settlers
from
entering
Gaza.
The
large
population
of antagonistic
Gazans,
drawing
on
their
long
history
of
military
resistance,
waged
a
war
on
the
occupation
that
made
it
difficult
for
Israel
to
build settlements
and
military
outposts.
The
difficulty
entering
and
maneuvering Gaza
left
the
Israelis
with
inadequate
troops
to
govern
1.5
million
Arabs.
As
the settlements
remained
sparsely
populated,
the
Israeli
leaders
decided
they were
not
worth
defending.
Israel
cut
its
losses
in
Gaza
and
focused
on
its annexation
of
large
settlement
blocs
in
the
tamer
West
Bank.
Military
resistance
in
the
Arab
and
Muslim
world
has
brought
a
degree of
freedom
to
the
people.
Violence
inspires
an
invader
to
leave
by inflicting
a
cost
upon
occupiers
who
will
not
negotiate.
They
realize
that the
economic
and
political
advantages
gained
through
conquest
will
be
offset by
the
death
of
their
own
soldiers
and
the
loss
of
control
of
a
hostile population.
Military
resistance
also
benefits
from
a
sound
political strategy,
as
we
have
seen
in
the
case
of
Hezbollah.
There
are,
of
course,
limits
to
what
violence
can
accomplish.
Resistance to
Israeli
occupation
is
complicated
by
the
Israelis’
conviction
that
they deserve
most
of
historic
Palestine.
Most
Israelis,
even
the
messianic land-grabbers,
will
sacrifice
their
“right”
to
the
Sinai
and
South
Lebanon,
just
as
U.S.
residents
feel
no
urge
to
make
Iraq
the
51st
state.
Israelis will
resist,
though,
Palestinian
efforts
to
liberate
Jerusalem--even
more
so towns
like
Haifa
and
Tel
Aviv.
They
will
resist
this
with
their
nuclear weapons
if
they
feel
their
homes
and
lives
are
threatened.
Israeli
desire for
a
Jewish
majority
presents
an
obstacle
for
the
Palestinian
National Movement,
which,
for
the
most
part
in
the
wealthy
diaspora,
has
brought
to
the
problem
of
historic
Palestine
only
its
central
demand
of
“full
right
of
refugee
return.”
Caise
welcomes
your
comments
via
email:
caised@comcast.net
